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SOME MYTH ABOUT POSITIVISM
W. L. MORISONt
"His estimate of men was low," wrote Sarah Austin of her late husband,
John, "and his solicitude for their approbation was consequently small."1 No
doubt this attitude contributed to Austin's peace of mind, "unaccustomed as
he was to any public recognition of his merits." 2 One gathers, however, that
Sarah did not share her husband's indifference and must have been considerably
gratified by the celebrity that Austin's memory achieved in the eighteen-sixties.
Had she survived until 1871, she might have been even more delighted by Sir
William Markby's words to the effect that the subject of the nature of law
had been "exhausted" by Austin and that his conclusions had since received
the general acceptance of English jurists.3 And by the eighteen-nineties, com-
mentators on the American continent apparently viewed all Englishmen as
Austinians.4 This idea drew forth an irascible reaction from Sir Frederick
Pollock, who regarded Austin's "particular form of Naturrecht" as "already
dead and buried for all students who have any sense of history."'
The reaction following Austin's brief heyday of popularity has been so com-
plete that, since Pollock wrote, many writers and thinkers have appeared who
apparently wish that some form of suttee had existed in the England of 1859
whereby Austin's theories might have been buried along with their author.
Hostility to Austin has become so marked, in the United States in particular,
that a student might be forgiven if he interpreted Holmes's association of posi-
tivism with the bad man's viewpoint as a personal reference to Austin. To some
extent, this hostility can be regarded as an outcome of objections to analytical
jurisprudence from the historical and sociological perspective. But to a greater
degree it appears attributable to the fact that Austin has become a symbol for
the theory that judicial decisions are mechanical applications of rules previously
laid down by higher authority. One hears Austin constantly mentioned in this
context, though his work does not appear on any of the recommended reading
lists of the deans of American law schools. 6 In Australia, the belief that
Austin's analytical system involve a series of mechanical derivations has de-
termined the role which Julius Stone assigns to the Austinian system in the
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jurisprudential scheme of things.7 In Canada, the allegation that Austin denied
that judges make law has appeared in print 8 contemporaneously with Professor
Hart's opposite conclusion in the Harvard Law Review.9 The charge is of
respectable antiquity in England itself, having been made as early as 1920 by
Sir Paul Vinogradoff.10
This unwarranted situation may justify the appearance of an article whose
limited purpose is to set the record straight so that discussion about Austin
may proceed on a more fruitful plane. Jurisprudence, after all, builds upon
achievements of the past, and careful examination of history is essential to its
development. The straw man created by the current misunderstanding of
Austin's position has provided some with a whipping-boy to be denigrated,
and others with a figure whose position may be defended in theory, but must
ultimately be condemned as empirically inaccurate. Either exercise is a waste
of energy which might better be spent in discerning the real issues raised by
the Utilitarians ; for an appreciation of these issues must precede their settlement.
THE ANATOMY OF THE STRAW MAN
Austin and Judicial Legislation
Best exemplifying the common view of Austinian theory-though many ex-
amples could be offered-is Edward McWhinney's formulation. After sug-
gesting that analytical positivism may be an Austinian derivation from the
German "Begriffsjurisprudenk,"'1 McWhinney proceeds:
7. See STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW ch. 2 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as STONE].
8. AlcWhinney, English Legal. Philoophy and Canadian Legal Philosophy, 4 McGilu
L.J. 213 (1958).
9. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593,
603-10 (1958).
10. 1 VINOGRAJDOFF, OuTnINF-s OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 116 (1920).
The allegations are continuing. Filmer S. C. Northrop writes that "the positive
legal rules and theoretical principles referred to by the judge are not, as the Austinian
legal positivist affirms, the criteria of his judgment." Northrop, The Mediational Approval
Theory of Law in American Legal Realism, 44 VA. L. REV. 347, 353 (1958). Edgar
Bodenheimer concedes that Austin's belief that judges do make law has been demonstrated
and restates the criticism of Austin in terms of Austin's alleged ideal that judges should
not make law. Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of
Legal Method, 44 VA. L. REv. 365, 369 (1958). Yet Bodenheimer ultimately concludes
that Pound's position about Austin is still valid, though he quotes Pound as saying that
the analysts assume the existence of "a complete body of law with no gaps and no antin-
omies, given authority by the state at one stroke and so to be treated as if every item
was of the same date as every other." Id. at 365. Surely it should have been conceded
that Pound's view needs substantial revision at least.
11. McWhinney, supra note 8, at 213. In fact, the main doctrines of analytical posi-
tivism were laid down by Jeremy Bentham, who in turn was heavily indebted to Hobbes
and others of the British empiricists. Bentham was regarded as the founder of analytical
positivism by Continental followers before Austin had begun to write, thanks, no doubt,
to the activities of Bentham's French expositor, Dumont. See REDDIE, INQUIRIES IN THE
SCIENcE OF LAW 50 (2d ed. 1847). Reddie cites as his source of information M1. Rossi,
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Analytical positivism rests, first, on the command or imperative theory
of law-that that is law which is laid down by duly constituted political
authority-in the case of England, by the sovereign Parliament-and that
only that is law. From the command theory of law is derived a normative
proposition that judges have no business making law, for that is the busi-
ness of the legislature and it would be usurping the legislator's functions for
the judges to do so: from this normative proposition is derived a further,
descriptive proposition that judges, in the process of decision-making, have
not, as a question of fact, been concerned with questions of what the law
ought to be but only with what the law is-that the judicial function has
in the past been merely to "find" or "declare" the law and never to make
it.12
If anyone is to be convicted of advancing this theory, Austin certainly seems,
at first sight, the most likely suspect among the analysts. It can hardly be
attributed to his successor, Holland, who merely argues that law consists of
rules enforced by the sovereign, nor to Salmond, the early twentieth-century
English positivist, or Gray, his American contemporary, who find the char-
acteristic mark of law in judicial enforcement. Austin, after all, does say that
laws are commands set by the sovereign. But, as Professor Hart has noted,
Austin also alludes, in a number of passages, to the existence of judicial legis-
lation and even accuses some judges of legislative timidity in language fore-
shadowing later pronouncements by Pollock and Lord Denning.'3
One sometimes hears the suggestion that the passages quoted by Hart must
be regarded as untypical in the light of Austin's general theory. If they
are untypical, however, they certainly are not isolated. Lecture XXXVII of
Austin's Jurisprudence is entirely devoted to a comparison of statutory and
judge-made law. The whole of Lecture XXXVIII seeks to demonstrate that
some common objections to judicial legislation are groundless. And all of
Lecture XXXIX is reserved for a discussion of the real problems attending
judicial legislation and the ultimate superiority of a code system. Throughout
these chapters, Austin's consistent assumption is that judicial law-making is
an existing, influential force, and that the sole issue is whether its function
should be largely supplanted by codification. This question he answers affirma-
tively; but he explicitly recognizes that judicial legislation would survive the
enactment of a code, and suggests that the law so evolved might properly be
wrought into statutory form from time to time.14 Many other references to
the judges' role in legislating appear outside the chapters mentioned, particu-
larly in those sections of Jurisprudence dealing with the sources of law. Austin
states that judges frequently base their decisions on customs of ancient or recent
De I'Etude du Droit, ANTNALs DE LEGISL. ET DE JURISp. (1820). With respect to Austin
himself, Mill writes from personal experience that "he never ceased to be an utilitarian,
and with all his love of the Germans, and enjoyment of their literature, never became in
the smallest degree reconciled to the innate-principle metaphysics." MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY
151 (1924 ed.).
12. McWhinney, supra note 8.
13. Hart, supra note 9, at 609.
14. 2 AusTiN 675.
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origin,"; on their notions of public policy, or on simple expediency ;16 that they
adopt as law the opinions and practices of conveyancers 17 and the advocatory
writings of lawyers motivated by considerations of utility ;18 that they interpret
statutes according to their personal notions of what the legislature should have
meant ;19 that they apply the theories of their predecessors to new cases ;20 and
that they sometimes "legislate" to further their own class interests, those of
their appointors, 21 or those of the legal fraternity.22 Finally, he refers to "the
childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or common law is not
made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody .... ,,23 After
all this, he could hardly have anticipated that he himself would one day be re-
garded as the leading theoretical apologist for that same childish fiction.
One may argue, of course, that Austin cannot consistently affirm that judges
legislate and simultaneously claim that law is a body of commands set by the
sovereign. This may be true. The argument nevertheless fails to support an
inference that Austin really believed that judges do not create law; for Austin
thought that he had successfully reconciled both aspects of his theory by
exploiting the notion of the legislature's acquiescence in acts of judicial law-
making. Thus, he explains that rules which judges formulate derive their
legal force from authority granted by the state, "an authority which the state
may confer expressly, but which it commonly imparts in the way of acquiescence.
For, since the state may reverse the rules which he makes, and yet permits
him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign
will 'that his rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though
not by its express declaration.1 24 Bentham had expounded the conception
elaborately in his posthumously published work, The Limits of Jurisprudence
Defined,m and it even entered into his definition of law as "an assemblage of signs
declarative of a volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign . ".. .,26 Adoption
may occur, he explained, prior to the time at which the mandate adopted is
expressed (preadoption) or subsequently (susception) ,27 the latter mode being
exemplified by the sovereign's adoption of his predecessors' mandates, and
both modes being applicable to the mandates of judges and other subordinate
power-holders.2 8 Regarding the sovereign's mere failure to forbid an act as a tacit
adoption of the act, Bentham drew some startling conclusions:
15. Id. at 539, 543.
16. Id. at 539.
17. Id. at 546.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 635.
20. Id, at 641.
21. Id. at 643-44.
22. Id. at 645.
23. Id. at 634.
24. 1 AUsTIN 102.
25. BENTHAi, THE LnInTS OF JURISPRUDE~cE DEFINED (Everett ed. 1945).
26. Id. at 88.
27. Id. at 104.
28. Ibid.
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Take any mandate whatsoever, either it is of the number of those which
he allows or it is not: there is no medium: if it is, it is his; by adoption
at least, if not by original conception: if not, it is illegal, and the issuing
it an offence. Trivial or important makes no difference: if the former are
not his, then neither are the latter. The mandates of the master, the father,
the husband, the guardian, are all of them the mandates of the sovereign:
if not, then neither are those of the general nor of the judge. Not a cook
is bid to dress a dinner, a nurse to feed a child, an usher to whip a school-
boy, an executioner to hang a thief, an officer to drive the enemy from
a post, but it is by his orders.29
This theory of adoption allowed Austin, like Bentham, to reconcile his
definition of law with the admitted reality of judicial and other kinds of sub-
ordinate legislation. For both, judicial legislation was the product of legis-
lator and judge conjunctively, "the legislator sketching out a sort of imperfect
mandate which he leaves it to the subordinate power-holder to fill up."30 The
weakness of their position here-despite Bentham's protestations to the con-
trary- lies in the fictional nature of the adoption notion. But neither Austin's
nor Bentham's accounts of judicial legislation ought automatically to be held
aberrational, as if this notion were not part of their command theory.
McWhinney at least avoids the confusion sometimes generated by commenta-
tors who fail to distinguish between the Utilitarians' attitudes regarding whether
judges ought to make law and their estimation of whether judges do in fact
legislate. He offers two distinct, if inaccurate, propositions: first, that analysts
believe judges should not create law; and second, that analysts are convinced
judges do not. Sir Paul Vinogradoff, in his account of Austin, sometimes
appears to attribute one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both, of these
views to Austin. "Austin's statements," says Vinogradoff, "in their extreme
barrenness, were the appropriate vehicle for a theory of law in the sense of a
formal machinery. As the bailiff serving a writ or the policeman effecting an
arrest is formally justified by his warrant and would meet all protests and
complaints by a reference to that warrant, so the judge from Austin's point
of view is merely the agent of the Sovereign who has appointed him and who
guarantees the execution of his decisions. It is not of his office to consider
independently the justice of any claims except those expressly reserved by
law or logically derived from existing legal rules." 3'
Bentham's reaction to these remarks-had he survived to subject Vinograd-
off to the same sort of dissection that he performed on Blackstone's work in the
Fragment on Government and the Comment on the Commentaries-is not diffi-
cult to imagine. Bentham complains that Blackstone, having begun a sentence
in the character of an historical observer, suddenly becomes a censor and so
asserts not facts but sentiments of approbation. "The distinction," says Ben-
tham, "perhaps, is what never so much as occurred to him; and indeed the
29. Id. at 105.
30. Id. at 109.
31. 1 VINOGRAIOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORIcAL JuRIsPRuDENcE 116 (1920).
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shifting insensibly, and without warning, from one of these characters to the
other, is a failing that seems inveterate in our Author .... 132 The annoyance
of the Benthamite Austin at Vinogradoff's ambiguous account of Austin's
own work would have been even greater. Whichever way Vinogradoff's inter-
pretation is understood, it is multiply inaccurate. If he meant to express
Austin's view of the actual relations between judge and sovereign, then his
treatment is falsified by Austin's recognition that judges freely make law in
a multitude of situations other than those mentioned by Vinogradoff. If he
meant to represent Austin's opinion of the proper relation between sovereign
and judge, he is falsifying Austin's place in the history of jurisprudence, for
Austin, preferring to deal with laws as they were, left censorial jurispru-
dence largely to Bentham. Even apart from this consideration, however, his
portrayal would be incorrect, since Austin, as already suggested, certainly
does not say that a judge should not legislate. Quite the contrary, such judicial
activity may be wholly proper, especially in societies like the one in which
Austin himself wrote. What he did affirm is that a judge should follow the
terms of a clear statute; and since he proposed codification, he naturally looked
forward to a decreasing necessity for judicial legislation.
Austhz: Dreamer or Observer?
Vinogradoff classifies Bentham and Austin as rationalists, 3 3 and Julius Stone
classifies Austin in the same way.34 The application of this slippery word
to the analysts may well have contributed to the current misinterpretations of
their theories. Vinogradoff appears to employ the term in a variety of senses.
At the outset, he contrasts rationalism with authoritarianism, explaining that
the eighteenth century was rationalist because it believed that the facts of law
could be subjected to the same methods of observation and deductive reasoning
that are used in synthesizing the facts of the physical sciences.3 5 But he im-
mediately goes on to contrast "rationalism proper," which draws deductions
from a priori principles, with the physical science method, which is concerned
with co-ordinating the facts of experience under general laws.36 He then ex-
plains that men utilizing the latter method qualify as rationalist in the sense
32. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 150 (Montague ed. 1891). Compare
Bentham's comments, id. at 237:
He sets out with the word dut-y in his mouth; and, in the character of a Censor,
with all due gravity begins talldng to us of what ought to be. 'Tis in the midst of
this lecture that our Proteus slips aside; puts on the historian; gives an insensible
turn to his discourse; and, without any warning of the change, finishes with telling
us what is. Between these two points, indeed, the is and the ought to be, so opposite
as they frequently are in the eyes of other men, that spirit of obsequious quietis;m
that seems constitutional in our Author, will scarce ever let him recognize a
difference.
33. 1 VINOCGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTOICAL JURISPRUDENCE 116-17 (1920).
34. STONE 49.
35. 1 VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 104 (1920).
36. Id. at 105.
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that they trust in intellectual interpretation of the facts. At this point, Vino-
gradoff is presumably in a position to describe as a rationalist, in one sense
or another, anyone who believes that true general statements can be asserted
about anything, whether such statements purport to be derived from experience
or, in the case of "rationalists proper," from a priori postulates. Bentham,
he says, belongs not with the rationalists proper but with that class of em-
piricists who may be called rationalists because they attempt an intellectual
interpretation of observed factsY7 He apparently holds the same view of
Austin, whom he groups with Bentham.
Stone, on the other hand, characterizes Austin as what Vinogradoff would
call a "rationalist proper." For Stone, analytical jurisprudence in general is
"a rational as distinct from an empirical study."8 Hence, Stone does not
regard Austin's initial postulate, the definition of law, as having been intended
to represent observation or experience in any way. The definition, in his
opinion, seeks only to provide a basis for logical arrangement of a legal system.
Thus:
Austin's theory is not a description of an actual state nor of actual law.
... [It is] a formal theory from which has been abstracted all reference
either to actual political and social conditions or to desirable political and
social conditions.... These definitions and the deductions from them belong
to one dream of arranging a body of law in a logically interdependent
system ...
[A] system such as Austin's is purporting to expose the premisses from
which each particular rule may follow as a conclusion, and to ascertain
how far all such premisses may be ultimately found to stand together con-
sistently with one supreme set of premisses, like the definition of "law" and
"sovereign" or of the "necessary legal conceptions." 39
Stone does not contend that this interpretation of Austinian jurisprudence
is consistent with all Austin wrote.40 But he explains away incompatible state-
ments as lapses to which Austin was subject when he momentarily forgot that
he was outlining not actuality but a logical dream world. He accordingly dis-
misses Austin's attempt to exemplify "sovereigns" by reference to contemporary
European and American communities as an "incidental weakness" arising from
Austin's departure from his proper sphere of discourse, contrary to his "main
purpose and contribution." 41 His own view of Austin's work, Stone argues,
is supported by passages in which Austin expresses his hope that students
will perceive how the more minute rules of law depend upon general principles
appearing throughout the legal structure,4 and his belief in certain "necessary"
principles without which a system of law could not be imagined.43
37. Id. at 105-06.
38. STONE 49.
39. Id. at 60, 61, 13A.
40. See Stone's section entitled "Austin's Own Contribution to This Confusion,"
id. at 61-62.
41. Id. at 62.
42. Id. at 57-58 (citing to 2 AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 1116 (3d ed. 1869)).
43. Compare the discussion in text accompanying notes 76-98 infra.
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It seems natural to infer, as Hart has, that, under the Stone view, Austin
should have denied the existence of judicial legislation.44 If all the laws con-
templated by the Austinian system are inevitable deductions from a priori
definitions, a judge can only declare, never create, them. It should be re-
emphasized, however, that Stone discounts Austin's allusions to judicial legisla-
tion only because he believes that Austin's analytical system self-consciously
disregards the rules which actually control society in order to deal with a logic-
ally derived, "pure" law. In fact, he distinguishes Austin's philosophy from that
of the German school of Begriffsjurisprudenz precisely on the ground that the
Germans, believing their logical system to represent actuality, felt the need to
deny the existence of judicial legislation.4 5 And, considering Austin to have
avoided this identification, Stone feels that his system is unobjectionable and
useful where Begriffs]urisprudenz is not.46 Thus, although Stone may fail to
mention Austin's recognition of judicial legislation when he discusses Austin's
analytical system, he does specifically refer to the Austinian treatment of
judicial law-making when he deals with the actual legal control of society.47
His argument, therefore, would presumably be that Austin, speaking as an ob-
server of facts, recognized judicial legislation and hence would have had to con-
cede that a divergence exists between the rules governing society and the "laws"
of his own closed system. Accordingly, the proper objection to Stone's position
is not that he denies Austin's recognition of judicial legislation but that he is
forced to regard Austin's extensive treatment of this subject as outside the
Austinian scheme of analytical jurisprudence-though Austin himself, and
Bentham, as already demonstrated, took considerable pains to fit judicial legis-
lation into the analytical scheme by utilizing the notion of acquiescence.
The difficulties inherent in Stone's rationalist interpretation are by no means
confined to those which Stone himself mentions nor to those presented by
passages of Austin's work recognizing judicial legislation. Stone might dismiss
the latter as he did the former-as temporary lapses during which Austin lost
sight of his main purpose, or as conscious adventures outside his main universe
of discourse. The major inadequacy of Stone's interpretation is that it runs
directly counter to what the Utilitarians regarded as the fundamental tenets of
their jurisprudential school. Leslie Stephen, himself personally associated with
members of the Benthamite school and the author of a three-volume treatise
about them,4s thus evaluates their contribution to knowledge: "The strong
points of Benthamism may, I think, be summed up in two words. It meant
reverence for facts. Knowledge was to be sought not by logical jugglery but
by scrupulous observation and systematic appeals to experience. '49 Yet Pro-
44. Hart, Positivis= and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593,
608 n.32 (1958).
45. STONE 155, 161.
46. Id. at 161.
47. Id. at 196.
48. STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS (1900).
49. STEPHEN, LIFE OF SIR JAMiES FITrZJAMiES STEPHEN 123 (2d ed. 1895).
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fessor Stone sees Austin as deliberately excluding all empirical references and
preferring to engage in the syllogistic extrapolation of merely postulated prem-
ises. Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that Austin, no doubt rather im-
pudently, claims membership in the historical school of jurisprudence for his
mentor Bentham; and his reasons are precisely those that he advances in reject-
ing the method of rationalism which Stone was later to attribute to him.
"Bentham," says Austin, "belongs strictly to the historical school of jurispru-
dence. The proper sense of that term as used by the Germans is, that the jurists
thus designated think that a body of law cannot be spun out from a few general
principles assumed a priori, but must be founded on experience of the subjects
and objects with which the law is conversant." And he adds: "The meaning
of their being called the historical school is simply this, that they agree with
Bentham in thinking that law should be founded on an experimental view of
the subjects and objects of law, and should be determined by general utility,
not drawn out from a few arbitrary assumptions a priori called the law of
nature."50 Further proof of the Utilitarian attitude toward the separation of
theory and practice is found in John Stuart Mill's account of his father's re-
action when, at the age of thirteen, the younger Mill innocently remarked that
something might be true in theory but not in practice. James Mill's indignant
outburst left his son "fully persuaded that in being unable to give a correct
definition of Theory, and in speaking of it as something which might be at
variance with practice, I had shown unparalleled ignorance." 51 Although Mill
thought his father's anger somewhat unreasonable, he never forgot the lesson.
He might equally well have learned it from Austin, who became his tutor some
years later 52 and whose first lectures on jurisprudence he attended and noted.53
One can imagine that the following passage in Austin's lectures must have
awakened painful recollections in his student:
' 'Tis true in theory; but, then, 'tis false in practice.' Such is a common
talk. This says Noodle; propounding it with a look of the most ludicrous
profundity.
But, with due and discreet deference to this worshipful and weighty
personage, that which is true in theory is also true in practice.
Seeing that a true theory is a compendium of particular truths, it is neces-
sarily true as applied to particular cases. The terms of the theory are
general and abstract, or the particular truths which the theory implies
would not be abbreviated or condensed. But, unless it be true of particu-
lars, and, therefore, true in practice, it has no truth at all. Truth is
always particular, though language is commonly general. Unless the terms
of a theory can be resolved into particular truths, the theory is mere
jargon: a coil of those senseless abstractions which often ensnare the
instructed; and in which the wits of the ignorant are certainly caught and
entangled, when they stir from the track of authority, and venture to think
for themselves.5 4
50. 2 AusTIx 679.
51. MILL, AUToBiOGRAPHY 27 (1924 ed.).
52. Id. at 53.
53. 1 AUSTIN V.
54. Id. at 115-16.
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Ironically, the man who applied these derogatory epithets to the view that
theory and experience may disagree has become identified with that view.6r
Austin has been saddled not only with the "childish fiction" that judges do
not legislate but with Noodle's "coil of senseless abstractions" as well.
It may nevertheless be argued that Austin's fundamental opposition to ration-
alism is irreconcilable with his belief in the feasibility of a science of expository
jurisprudence. Austin's remarks on this matter are those to which Professor
Stone appeals in support of his own interpretation of the philosopher's work.
If such an inconsistency exists, however, the conclusion should be that Austin's
theory does not cohere, not that the true substance of his jurisprudence can
be precipitated by rejecting its empirical foundations. For on these founda-
tions much of his theory is built. In particular, his concepts of law as a com-
mand of the sovereign, and of rights, duties, powers and obligations as mere
statements of the relations involved in this basic idea, represent an attempt to
describe legal rules in strictly factual terms in order to make them identifiable
in the social process. Stone has to argue that, for Austin, sovereignty is a
logical postulate and not a political fact. 56 But Stone offers no evidence from
Austin's work to support this conclusion, and relies rather on inferences from
Frederic Harrison's remarks that Austinian theory presupposes "that the
lawyer is considering sovereignty only on the side of force," that "the force
that [the sovereign] . . . exerts [is] unlimited," and that there exists "except
in moments of anarchy ... a perfectly defined centre of sovereign power ...
where the spheres of positive law and of moral obligation are habitually treated
as separate." "It must be apparent," comments Stone, "that any body of
knowledge based upon such patently artificial presuppositions is not a body
of knowledge about any particular society." 57 Although this notion may indeed
seem "apparent" now, one can properly attribute it to Austin only if Austin
can be shown to have been aware of his making these assumptions, and of
their falsity. All of the first-hand evidence shows, however, that Bentham and
Austin each believed that the sovereigns which he described actually existed,
and that the attempts which each made to find them were not mere fits of
absent-mindedness. "There is commonly in a State," writes Bentham,
"some person or body of persons whose office it is to assign to and distribute
among the members of the Government their several departments, their func-
tions, and their prerogatives, while retaining a general authority over them
severally and collectively. The person or body of persons exercising this su-
preme power is termed 'the Sovereign.' "8 Bentham in fact argues that a
people which ceases to recognize a sovereign is doomed:
55. Austin's associates are quick to remark that one should not be misled about
Austin's mild and sensitive nature by his strong language. See Mill, Austin on Juris-
prudence, 118 EDINBUPGH Ray. 439, 481 (1863), reprinted in 4 MiLL, DIssERTATIONS AND
DiscussioNs 210, 277 (1867).
56. SToNE 60.
57. Id. at 61.
5S. 2 BENTHAM, TnEORY OF LEGISLATION 6-7 (1914).
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I will only observe that the division [of power] must not involve the
creation of separate and independent powers, for that would lead to a
state of anarchy. It is always necessary to recognize some authority
superior to all others, which does not receive law, but gives it, and retains
supreme control even over the very rules it has itself laid down to regulate
its own mode of action.59
To multiply examples of Bentham's references in a factual context to the
sovereign would be tedious in the extreme. The same is true with respect to
Austin. Stone claims that Austin's whole approach differs from Hobbes's
in that Hobbes, unlike Austin, was attempting to give an account of actual
society.60 Yet Austin himself rejects one feature of Hobbes's definition of
sovereignty on the explicit ground that, if accepted, it would not apply to any
existing society.61 And though he generally agrees with that philosopher's
main tenets, Austin persistently complains that Hobbes inculcates too abso-
lutely the religious obligation of obedience to established government and
that he explains the origin of sovereignty by a fiction, when better investigation
would have disclosed that sovereignty subsists because the governed recognize
its obvious expediency. 2 Still, if Stone is right about Austin's views, Austin's
attempts to establish his own views of sovereignty, as against Hobbes's, by
means of an appeal to facts, constitute yet another aberration.
Remaining for' consideration are those sections of Austin's work which
Stone cites as positive evidence for his interpretation. These sections appear
almost exclusively in Austin's essay on the "Uses of the Study of Jurispru-
dence." Here, Austin writes that the principles common to maturer systems
of law are the subject of an extensive science whose exclusive or at least appro-
priate object is their exposition.6 3 Here, too, he contends that of the principles,
notions, and distinctions which are the subjects of general jurisprudence, some
may be esteemed necessary, since no system of law (or system of law in a
refined community) can be coherently imagined without conceiving them as
constituent parts of it.64 Others are not necessary but occur very generally.6"
Stone's inference from these remarks-that Austin aims to find a universal
system of "law" by logical analysis from a priori notions-is not surprising.
If Austin means to suggest that the very conception of "law" involves conceiv-
ing a host of principles which follow necessarily, he certainly does seem a
"rationalist proper." And even though he does not say-and in fact dis-
affirms 6 6-that all the details of every legal system are conceptions necessarily
involved in the notion of law, this disaffirmance could simply be regarded as
59. Id. at 306.
60. STONE 60-61.
61. 1 AusTIN 234-35.
62. Id. at 279 n. (u).
63. 2 Ausnxl 1072.
64. Id. at 1073.
65. Id. at 1074.
66. Id. at 1072.
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contrary to the main direction of the thought that general jurisprudence is a
science; for one naturally imagines a science to be something comprehensive
in nature.
The best indications are that Austin had not thought his "system" through.
His material on a science of jurisprudence, after all, is contained in a brief
essay which he did not choose to publish in his lifetime; and the task of estab-
lishing an empirical definition of jurisprudence cannot be considered less
difficult than that of providing an empirical definition of law, a matter to which
Austin devoted practically exclusive attention in the major work he did pub-
lish. In defining jurisprudence, moreover, Bentham had introduced a mislead-
ing classification. Austin's mentor had divided jurisprudence into the ex-
pository and censorial branches and had further subdivided the expository
branch into the particular and the general, assigning the term "local" to the
exposition of a particular system of law.67 Austin, therefore, must at least have
toyed with the idea that a science of jurisprudence which attempted a compre-
hensive elucidation of the actualities, as distinct from the proprieties, of law,
must qualify as a general exposition of universally obtaining legal principles.
Bentham himself did not draw this conclusion, arguing that a general ex-
pository jurisprudence could at best provide terminological clarifications ;68
but Austin's enthusiasm for the science of jurisprudence seems to have led
him to use less guarded language than his teacher.
As Myres S. McDougal has indicated, an empirical theory about law con-
sisting of an exposition of legal principles as commonly understood is an
impossibility.6 9 To arrive, as Austin intended, at an empirical account of
what actually happens in the legal field, one must, following Austin's pro-
cedure, identify legal rules in some empirical way and then go on to examine,
the part these rules play in decision-making. At this point, conceivably, some
general propositions about rules may emerge; but they will be propositions
about rules, not mere expressions of the rules. In this connection, Austin's own
theory that a legal rule expresses only the content of a command is thoroughly
inconsistent with the notion that legal rules themselves describe some sort
of truth.70
Nevertheless, because of Austin's tendency to identify a general theory
of law with the exposition of legal principles, Stone is able, by implication
at least, to credit Austin with viewing the definition of law as a part of ex-
67. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 324-25 (1907).
68. Id. at 325.
69. See, e.g., McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach
to Legal Study, 1 NATURAL L.F. 53, 59-64 (1956).
70. Austin's allusions to an expository jurisprudence, whether general or particular,
may in part be regarded as the unfortunate survival of Benthamite thinking. Probably,
too, his remarks on this subject stemmed from the very natural-law modes of thinking
which it was his main purpose to reject, according to which legal rules represent truths
pointed out by reason, and from the common speech of that time, which tended to identify
jurisprudence and "law."
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pository jurisprudence. Austin presents the definition of law, Stone feels,
as the fundamental premise of the legal system,71 as if it were some sort of
basic norm from which inferior norms are to be logically deduced. Support
for this interpretation is difficult to find in Austin's few and ambiguous allusions
to the relation between his definition of law and an expository jurisprudence.
In one place, Austin treats the definition of law as though it is separate from
general expository jurisprudence. An exposition of the necessary principles,
notions, and distinctions is impossible, he says, until the meaning of certain
terms which must necessarily be employed-such as Law, Right, Obligation,
Injury, Sanction; Person, Thing, Act, Forbearance-has been determined.72
Presumably, he would have regarded these definitions as equally prerequisite for
Bentham's censorial jurisprudence, for he could hardly have imagined that, in
talking of what law ought to be, one is speaking of law in a sense different from
that in which he employed the term in his own inquiries. Hence, the definition
would have no specific relation to expository jurisprudence. 73 On the other
hand, Austin proposes as the first group of "necessary principles, notions,
and distinctions" themselves, "the notions of Duty, Right, Liberty, Injury,
Punishment, Redress; with their various relations to one another, and to
Law, Sovereignty, and Independent Political Society." 4 The reappearance
of these conceptions in this context raises doubts, especially since the terms
are presented here shortly after a statement that general jurisprudence is an
exposition of principles of law. Austin could conceivably mean that the state-
ment "law is a command of the sovereign" is a principle of law. Yet, contrari-
wise, on the very same page, Austin attributes Bentham's narrow view of
general jurisprudence to Benham's notion that such jurisprudence concerns
what "obtains" (emphasis Austin's) universally as law. 75 Austin thus strong-
ly suggests that his own view is different.
A BETTER VIEW OF AUSTIN'S ANALYTICAL SYSTEM
Austin's Classificatory Activity
One is tempted, therefore, to dismiss Stone's rationalistic interpretation
of Austin as an overstressing of one or two ambiguous propositions in a chapter
itself containing much in conflict with the interpretation suggested-especially
since the remainder of Austin's work abounds in evidence of his empirical
approach. This still does not foreclose argument that a considerable part of
Austin's work comprises exposition, not of necessary principles of law (for
one fails to recall a single one of these), but of what are supposed to be
71. See note 39 supra.
72. 2 AUSTIN 1075.
73. Yet, oddly enough, Bentham himself regarded the definition of law as part of
general expository jurisprudence. See BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF IVORALS AND LEGis-
LATION 324-25 (1907).
74. 2 AusTIN 1073.
75. Id. at 1073 n.56.
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necessary classifications. Perhaps, then, the rationalistic notions of his chapter
on the uses of jurisprudence are not to be deemed unimportant to him.
John Stuart Mill, from his attendance at Austin's lectures and his notion
of Austin's logical bases, seeks in his review of Austin's posthumously pub-
lished Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence to interpret Austin's "necessary
principles, notions and distinctions."'76 Of the principles Mill has little to say,
observing merely that substantive provisions of different systems naturally
contain similarities, designed as they are for the same world and the same
human nature.7 7 This may sound rationalistic, but Mill would certainly have
regarded the proposition as a generalization from experience. But, says Mill,
"there is also a certain common groundwork of general conceptions or notions,
each in itself very wide, and some of them very complex, which can be traced
through every body of law, and are the same in all. These conceptions are
not pre-existent; they are a result of abstraction, and emerge as soon as the
attempt is made to look at any body of -laws as a whole, or to compare one
part of it with another, or to regard persons, and the facts of life, from a legal
point of view."73 In Mill's mind, therefore, the necessary conceptions do not
exist a priori but are distilled by generalization from a study of laws and
other facts. And in studying rules of law, Mill took Austin to be studying
empirical data-"the legal institutions which exist, or have existed, among
mankind, considered as actual facts."7 9
The necessary distinctions are presented as deriving by "abstraction" from
the facts; but it has already been shown that Austin did not think abstract
propositions necessarily ceased to be true of the particulars from which they
are abstracted-if they did, they became, in his words, "'senseless abstrac-
tions." 0 And Mill agrees in his review that classification must be based on
really existent common features in the facts.3 1 To be sure, Mill concurs with
Stone that Austin is applying logic to law. 12 For Mill, however, classification
is a part of logic, 3 and it is on Austin's classificatory activities that he con-
centrates. The general science of jurisprudence merely presents schemes of
arrangement. It endeavors not to prescribe what should be the content and
relationships of the subjects with which laws are concerned, but merely to
describe the common features of those subjects and the common structure of
rules and systems.
Why, then, do Mill and Austin think that some notions and distinctions
are "necessary," and in what sense are they speaking? The answer seems to
76. See Mill, Austin on Jirisprudence, 118 EDimBuma REv. 439 (1863), reprinted
in 4 MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DiscussioNs 210 (1867).
77. Id. at 443, reprint at 216.
78. Ibid.
79. Id. at 442, reprint at 214.
80. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. (Emphasis added.)
81. Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, 118 EDINBURGH , Ev. 439, 444 (1863), reprinted
in 4 MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DiscussioNs 210, 219 (1867).
82. Id. at 441, reprint at 213.
83. 1 MILL, SysTEm OF LoGic 11 (5th ed. 1862).
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lie in Benthamite conceptions of scientific classification. Bentham believed
that the materials of any science, including jurisprudence, were susceptible
of a natural classification,8 4 and for this reason "the same arrangement that
would serve for the jurisprudence of any one country, would serve with
little variation for that of any other." 85 Mill admiringly adopts Bentham's
notion that general scientific principles of classification apply to jurispru-
dence ;8r hence, Mill's exposition of the nature of classification in his System
of Logic provides many insights into his understanding of the nature of
Austin's classificatory activities. Moreover, since Mill's exposition represents
a rather extensive adaptation of the scholastic logic, for which Austin's affection
is well known,87 Mill's understanding is probably very much akin to Austin's
own.
In Mill's scheme, any definition is in one sense verbal. What it does is to
attach a name to an attribute or combination of attributes. 88 So, Mill would
undoubtedly argue, what Austin's definition of law does is to adopt the name
"law" for commands of a sovereign in an independent political society. Mill
adds, however, that a definition is also commonly intended to assert that the
attributes to which the name is attached really do exist in combination ;8s and
he certainly understands Austin to be saying that independent societies exist
in which sovereigns issue commands. The definition proper, Mill explains,
is a mere identical proposition, giving information only about the use of
language, and from which no conclusions affecting matters of fact can ever
be drawn.90 Obviously, then, Mill would not have thought that Austin was
attempting to derive conclusions about the nature of law from his definition
of law as such. But, Mill continues, the postulate accompanying the definition
does affirm a fact, and this may lead to consequences of every degree of im-
portance.91 This accompanying affirmation of "truth" is not, however, a postu-
late in Stone's sense-an assumption not intended to represent actuality. In-
sofar as it asserts the existence of the attributes in combination, the postulate
can only result from empirical investigation. Nor, according to Mill's theory,
do the consequences stemming from the postulate derive independently of
factual investigation. The consequences determined by demonstration from
the postulate are consequences which have been established by investigations
including those which established the postulate itself.92 But certain other
consequences are discoverable which are established not by demonstration but
by causation. Through factual investigations of the objects which possess the
84. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOvERNmENT 117-18 (1891).
85. Id. at 119.
86. MILL, SYSTEM OF LoGic 478-79 (1889).
87. "I ought to have been a schoolman of the twelfth century .... " 1 AUSTIN 12.
88. 1 MILL, SYSTEM OF LoGic 121-30 (5th ed. 1862).
89. Id. at 124.
90. Id. at 163.
91. Ibid.
92. This seems clear from the examples he gives, ibid., understood in the light of
Mill's general theory of logic.
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combination of attributes specified in the definition, one can discover (by
various methods which Mill outlines) that these attributes cause other attri-
butes to be present along with themselves; in other words, a necessary connec-
tion exists between the attributes specified in the definition and those discovered
by an investigation of the objects possessing them. 3 Here is the Utilitarian
explanation of Austin's necessary notions and distinctions common to all
systems of law. They are either attributes of legal systems the existence of
which is demonstrated by the investigations that led to or surrounded the dis-
covery of sovereign commands, or they are the attributes of those systems
which are caused by the presence of the attributes specified in the definition
of law.
Mill casts his views into the terms of the scholastic logic familiar to Austin.
4
The classical theory of definition is by genus and difference, the genus repre-
senting a general class and the difference constituting the attribute which dis-
tinguishes a given species from the genus. Mill argues, however, that in true
species there are an indefinite number of attributes distinguishing the species
from the genus. The attributes denominated as the difference are distinguish-
able from the others only by virtue of the terms employed in the definition.
Thus, if the attribute is part of the connotation of the name denoting the sub-
ject of the definition-that is, if the attribute is specified in the predicate of
the definition-it is included in the difference; otherwise, it is not. The dis-
tinguishing attributes of the species which are not included in the definition,
but which are established by demonstration or causation to be necessary accom-
paniments of those which are specified, Mill takes to be the propria recognized
by the scholastic logicians. So, in this scheme, Austin's necessary notions and
distinctions would appear as propria in relation to law. Mill goes on to complete
the classical scheme of classification by noting that, in addition to propria.
there are accidents of a species. These neither are involved in the definition
of the name denoting the species nor have the necessary connection with the
attributes connoted by that name to qualify as propria. They may be insepar-
able accidents, which means that, although experience has so far shown them
to be present wherever the combination of attributes constituting the species
is found, no reason can be assigned for the phenomenon, and further investiga-
tion might prove the connection less than universal. Into this class, no doubt,
would fall those features which Austin found in all the systems he studied but
which he did not claim were necessary. Separable accidents are those attributes
which are known to appear only spasmodically in members of the species.
Into this category, presumably, would fall those institutions of particular legal
systems which are outside the subject matter of general jurisprudence.
Austin explains that jurisprudence is the science of what is "essential" to
law,0 5 and Mill clearly takes him to be using this term in contradistinction to
93. Id. at 148.
94. See id. at 146-49.
95. 2 Ausn 1077.
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"accidental." Thus, he explains Austin's purpose as being "to free from con-
fusion and set in a clear light those necessary resemblances and differences.
which, if not brought into distinct apprehension by all systems of law, are latent
in all, and do not depend on the accidental history of any."96 Again, he speaks
of Austin's task as "the disentangling of the classifications and distinctions
grounded on differences in things themselves, from those arising out of the mere
accidents of their history .... ,,97
Some may still wish to call a view of this sort rationalistic in a sense, how-
ever determinedly Mill argues that a meaningful classificatory activity depends
on generalization from experience. 98 In any event, it should be clear that,
under the Bentham-Austin-Mill logic, the affirmation of some necessary classi-
fications in all systems of law is not tantamount to an assertion that all details
of law are necessary implications of the nature of a legal system. Austin's
theory envisages many features of a system existing as accidental results
of history, rather than as propria. And even the propria are presented as
factual discoveries, not as logical deductions somehow following, without ex-
amination of relevant empirical contexts, from the definition itself.
"Necessary" Classifications and Judicial Legislation
Arguably, in positing any "necessary" classifications at all, a jurist is
formulating a theory in which judicial legislation can have only a limited
meaning. For it is well known that a judge frequently "legislates" by giving
a new meaning to the subject of a legal rule, that is, to the category to which
the rule attaches legal consequences. This appears to happen even with the
most general categories. Thus, the result in a particular case will often depend,
for instance, on whether a judge classes a fact complex as "contract" or "tort."
If the meanings of contract and tort are fixed by the nature of law itself, the
judge may be thought to have little freedom of movement. Perhaps it is
because Professor Hart has encountered this type of argument that he says
that Stone and Friedmann's attribution of a mechanical view of law to Austin
seems to depend on their belief that no theory of the meaning of legal terms
is possible if judges legislate.09
This argument, again, can only be sustained by carrying Austin into con-
clusions which might be derived from his vague remarks about a general ex-
pository jurisprudence but violate his whole empirical framework. If the
statement, "law is a command of the sovereign," is a principle of "law" in
Austin's analytical sense, it might follow that, because Austin thinks a notion
of contract having specific content is implicit in the definition of law, a judge
96. Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence, 118 EDINBURGH REv. 439, 444 (1863), reprinted
in 4 MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DIscussioNs 210, 219 (1867).
97. Id. at 440, reprint at 212.
98. 1 MILL, SYSTEM OF LoGic 345 (5th ed. 1862).
99. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 608
n.32 (1958).
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who gave a different interpretation of the term contract would be speaking
outside the "law." But Austin seems to be asserting only the matter-of-fact
proposition that any system of law is susceptible of classification under certain
categories.100 Therefore, if the law of a particular country turned out not to
correspond with one of his categories,1 0' Austin would take this as proof not
that the judges were wrong in law, but that he was wrong in fact-that a
conception which he believed to be among the propria of legal systems was
really only an accident. And, of course, many of the conceptions which Austin
believed he had established as propria have incontestably proved to be accidents.
It may serve as emphasis to notice that, of the Utilitarians, at least Mill
thought the principles of causation apply in the moral sciences as universally as
in the physical sciences. Accordingly, he would surely have said that, were
it not for the impossibility of acquiring all the relevant information, one could
accurately predict judicial decisions. A judgment would be the necessary
consequence of a combination of factors. Hence, the distinction between
notions necessary in law and legal notions which are not necessary is only
a distinction between those concepts which Mill regards as caused by the
nature of law and those which are caused by other factors operative in particular
cases. But to suggest that this notion of necessity involves the view that judges
make no "law" in Austin's sense of the term is to ignore the Austinian distinction
between positive laws and scientific laws of nature.10 2 As the Utilitarian James
Fitzjames Stephen says in his article on Austin: "[Science] has no more ten-
dency to govern... the conduct to which it refers than the Nautical Almanack
has to govern the tides.' 0 3
These, then, in summary fashion, are the points to be noted in any evaluation
of Austin's thinking on judicial legislation:
(1) Austin in his own writings repeatedly asserted the existence of judicial
legislation.
100. In Utilitarian writing it is often unclear whether the thought is that any system
of law will contain rules which in fact belong to certain classifications or whether the idea
is that the system will itself employ terms which connote these classifications. If Austin
is saying both, this would explain why terms like "law," "right," and "duty" appear in two
places in his exposition-once as Austin's choice of terms to connote certain attributes
and once as the terms or translation of the terms used by all systems of law to connote
them. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. Mill seems to stop short of this
position, for he says that the necessary notions are those "which, if not brought into distinct
apprehension by all systems of law, are latent in all . . . ." Mill, Austin on Jurisprudence,
118 EDINBURGH REv. 439, 444 (1863), reprinted in 4 MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DIscussIoxs
210, 219 (1867). This ambiguity, however, does not affect -the point under discussion in
text.
101. Or, if the proper interpretation of Austin is the second one suggested in note 100
supra, the judges ceased to use any term connoting the category in question.
102. See 1 AUsTIN 206-08.
103. English Jurisprudence, 114 EDINBURGH REv. 456, 465 (1861). This article is
attributed to Sir J. F. Stephen by Leslie Stephen, in the latter's LIFE OF SIR JAMES FITZ-
JAMES STEPHEN 484 (2d ed. 1895).
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(2) Bentham and Austin reconciled the fact of judge-made law with their
view that laws are sovereign commands by reasoning that those judicially
established principles which the sovereign leaves intact he approves and in-
ferentially asserts.
(3) Bentham, Austin, and Mill joined in holding law to be an empirical,
not a rational, science. The Utilitarians in fact denied that there are any
rational sciences at all.
(4) The definition "law is a command of the sovereign" is presented by
the Utilitarians not as a logical postulate from which substantive propositions
of law can be analytically deduced but rather as a connotation of the word
"law" in terms of empirical facts.
(5) Austin's notion of general jurisprudence as an exposition of principles
of law is inconsistent with the empirical foundations upon which the pre-
dominant part of his theory is based. Much that appears in the very chapter
introducing this view is in conflict with it. Austin's belief in necessary prin-
ciples, notions and distinctions, moreover, should not be taken to be an impli-
cation of his expository jurisprudence. More probably, this belief followed
from his grounding in the propria of scholastic logic, for which J. S. Mill
worked out an empirical interpretation.
(6) Thus undersood, Austin's affirmation of necessary principles, notions
and distinctions involved neither the assertion that all legal principles and
classifications follow from the nature of law nor even the view that any prin-
ciples or classifications are authoritatively prescribed for the judge by the
nature of law.
Erosion of Austin's Ideas Through the Apologists
The character of Stone's misinterpretations would perhaps be less im-
portant if Stone were not prepared to defend the philosophy he attributes
to Austin as a valid juristic theory. Stone seems ready to argue that if his
account is not really what Austin meant, it is at least what he should have
meant.104 And though, as Stone acknowledges, no one has presented the same
defense of Austin, 0 5 his view is not truly unique. Significantly, Stone derives
the most substantial support for his interpretation not from Austin but from
later writing about Austin. 0 6
Neo-Austinian thinking has resorted to various forms of rationalism in an
effort to defend Austin's empirical propositions from empirical attack and thus
has saved some of Austin's conclusions at the expense of his empirical frame-
work. The earliest manifestation of this tendency appears in James Fitzjames
Stephen's 1861 review of Austin's work. 0 7 Stephen's lapse appears to have
104. STONE 61, 62.
105. See Stone's reference to Lindsay's views, id. at 62.
106. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
107. English Jurisprudence, 114 EDINBURGH REv. 456 (1861), cited at note 103 supra.
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stemmed not so much from the difficulty of maintaining Austin's theories of
law as from the problem of justifying Ricardo's theory of political
economy, with which, in terms of scientific status, he compared Austin's
theory of law. Beginning in the Utilitarian, logical tradition, to which
Austin belonged, Stephen writes that "science is nothing more than a classifi-
cation, a shorthand description, of all the facts relating to the particular subject-
matter with which it is conversant."'' 08 He proceeds to argue, however, that,
since the facts of the moral sciences are transient and obscure, they cannot
be stated with the precision of a scientific rule. Nevertheless, he says, "the
truth of Ricardo's theory of rent is altogether unaffected by the circumstance
that the facts nowhere correspond to it."'10 9 Finally, by grouping Austin's
theory with Ricardo's,"' he seems to imply that this same evaluation can be
made of Austin's work. In recognizing the existence of "truth" in a theory
which does not correspond with facts, Stephen's account diverges sharply
from John Stuart Mill's treatment of the same matter. Mill's inference from
the transience of facts in the moral sciences was that, unfortunately, principles
derived from them might be only approximately true, that is, might only ap-
proximately correspond with the facts-not that such principles might have
other than empirical truth."'
Sir Henry Maine gave specific impetus to Stephen's line of Austinian inter-
pretation. Unlike other historical jurists, Maine was thoroughly sympathetic
to the Austinian analysis ;112 but, like Stephen, he conceived that Austin was
involved in a process of abstraction which caused deductions from Austinian
principles to lack strict truth. The Austinian idea of sovereignty, he believed,
had been developed through uniting all forms of government into a single
group by imagining them as stripped of every attribute except coercive force.
"[T]he deductions from an abstract principle," Maine says, "are never from
the nature of the case completely exemplified in facts ....
Like Stephen, Maine compares Austin's work with that of writers on
political economy, and this comparison may be used to indicate how Maine's
interpretation does violence to Austin's own estimate of his work. When the
classical economists are said to have abstracted the profit motive from the total
context of transactions of distribution and exchange, the real point being made
is that they assumed that people engaging in these transactions are always
dominated by the profit motive, whereas profit is only sometimes the dominant
factor in their actions. Naturally, their principles would not be completely
exemplified by the facts. But all the evidence indicates that when Austin made
general factual statements about independent political communities, he be-
lieved them to be universally true. Hewas not purporting to present a "pure"
108. Id. at 465.
109. Id. at 466.
110. Id. at 466-67.
111. MILL, SYSTEM OF LoGac 554 (1889).
112. See MAIE, EAnY HISTORY OF INsTITUTIONs 343 (1888).
113. Id. at 362.
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theory in which factors only sometimes operative are represented as always
operative so that "truth" in theory diverges from truth in fact. If, because
experience has shown his universal propositions to be too broad, attempts
have been made to accord them "theoretical truth," they should be recognized
as revising Austin, not interpreting him-as Maine assumed he was doing.
The process by which classical economic theories have been maintained as
"pure" theories in the face of facts contradicting their general propositions
has been happily termed "theoretic blight." It would be tedious to trace the
progress of this malady as it overtook Austin's theory-from the statements
of James Stephen and Maine through the writings of Frederic Harrison,"
1 4
and through Manning's remarks that Austin's theory represents a possible
tertium quid between truth and falsity." 5 Suffice it to say that, as an increasing
number of Austin's general statements have been found untrue, his theory has
been regarded as "abstracting" more and more from actual facts, until in the
present terminal stage Professor Stone represents the theory as having "ab-
stracted all reference either to actual political and social conditions or to desir-
able political and social conditions.""
6
CONCLUSION
Everyone writes the history of jurisprudence for himself. What one regards
as the true Austinian tradition will depend on what one considers to be the
important contribution that Austin made, a consideration which will in turn
depend upon what one accepts of Austin's philosophy. Thus, Stone regards
Austin's claims to the empirical method as contrary to "his main purpose and
contribution," for Stone, as already shown, defends the view that analytical
jurisprudence is a rational science. Yet it is difficult to see how this theory can
be developed in detail. If there are no sovereigns in the Austinian sense, not
even verbal inferences can be drawn from the statement that law is a com-
mand of the sovereign. A minor premise cannot even be supplied to support
an inference that something should be called a law. Stone assumes that Austin
began with a number of rules to be collated-law in the books, not actual
facts. But how these propositions are to be presented as deductions from the
postulation of a sovereign seems inexplicable in terms of a logical analysis
divorced from facts. The attempt to quiet Austin's title in a logical ivory
tower and thereby to endow him with a position more secure than, even if
inferior to, that of a sociological jurist dealing in actualities, has thus estab-
lished Austin's reputation as not merely a dreamer, but an incoherent dreamer.
To one who agrees that Austin's empirical approach. represents his real
contribution to legal philosophy, Hart's is the acceptable analysis: "Austin
114. Stone relies, in particular, on Harrison's commentary. See note 57 supra and ac-
companying text.
115. Manning, Austin To-Day: or 'The Proince of Jurisprudence' Re-Examined, in
MODERN THFORzS OF LAw 180, 212 (1933).
116. SToE 61.
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was determined to use in his analysis only clear, hard, empirical terms ...
but for this laudable enterprise he chose the wrong fundamental notions.'
' 1 7
From this perspective, Professor Fuller is entirely correct in regarding the
American realists, among others, as inheritors of the Austinian tradition;118
for whatever their excesses in treating authoritative rules as having no in-
fluence on legal decision, the American realists have made a determined effort
to describe legal processes in objective, factual terms. So, one reads Professor
Hart"9 and Professor Goodhart' 12  with a pang of regret when they
refer to the American realists in the past tense; and one laments Professor
Llewellyn's observation that the young fellow who wrote The Bramble Bush
no longer exists.' 2 1 Nonetheless, the natural-law doctrines against which the
Utilitarians struggled are not left unopposed. In America the theories of
Lasswell and McDougal draw heavily on Utilitarian theory and reinterpret
it, primarily in the light of modern psychological investigations. The theories
of the Scandinavian realists excite increasing attention. As for England, al-
though McWhinney feels that some English law schools are bogged down
in trivial problems of linguistic analysis, 22 his impatience will not be shared
by those who recall that the philosophical inspiration of these studies is the
attempt to exclude metaphysics by demonstrating its dependence on misunder-
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source of national pride.
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